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ELITE RECOGNITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A
A�
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1890-1940�
Harold R. Kerbo
Richard Shaffer
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo
Public officiaLs and elites in recent years tend
to discuss high unemployment rates in public. but
this was not always the case. Evidence gathered
from the New York Times between 1890 and 1940
indicate that high unemployment rates were Largely
ignored prior to 1920. After that year, however,
elite statements in the press reflect fLuctuations in
the economy and expLicitly mention unemployment.
Why did clites begin to recognize unem
ployment as a public issue? A reasonable expla
nation is that the working class gained some po
litical influence. Such influence may ha ve come
Crom disruption in the streets (Isaac and Kelly,
1981; Piven and Cloward, 1977), or from the
srengthening oC the Democratic Party, as it
searched Cor a new constituency.
Data and Analysis. In contrast to industrial
violence, researchers have no easy direct source
of data on protest by the unemployed. Indirect
data are often found in extensively-indexed
newspapers. (See, e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977;
Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Danzger, 1975; Sny
der and Kelly 1977).
Using the New York Times Index to locate
newspaper articles about these events from 1890
to 1940, our assistants then read and coded the
original article in the Times. Including only
protest events by the unemployed themselves
(including public assistance recipients), 303
protest even ts were coded. 1
For a n accuracy check, we randomly selected
six years and followed the same coding proce
dures 2 and, for key time periods, examined ev
ery page of the New York Times, reading arti
cles related to our subject matter. 3 Codes were
also corroborated by examining every page of
the San Francisco Chronicle during key time pe
riods for protest reports. 4 Each of the two news
papers included minor local events not found in
the other, but the total numbers of events were
close for both newspapers. The New York Times
da ta were also checked against nine major his
torical works containing reports of collective
protest by
the
unemployed. (Feder
1936;
Schlesinger 1957, ]959, 1960; Goldman 1953;
Garraty 1978; Hofstader
1955; Piven and
Cloward 1971, 1977).
We also coded 1,526 elite statements about
economic conditions and unemployment. As be
fore, we employed the New York Times Index
(1890-1940) to determine that an opinion about
the problems of the unemployed or general con
ditions oC unemployment had been voiced by
any
specific
person,
oCficia I organiza tion
(business group, religious group, or other volun
tary organization), or government agency. The
original New York Times article was then read
and the necessary informa tion coded. 5 Our defi

nition of elites and influential organizations
was very broad, bu t excl uded labor leaders and
organizations. 6 When statements by national po
litical elites (president, vice president, cabinet
members, top federal government agencies, and
members of Congres~) were coded separately,
they correlated .79 WIth those of overall elites.
Therefore, this separate group was dropped
from the analysis. Again, six years were ran
domly selected for coding accuracy checks. 7 (We
also examined the degree of sympathy expressed
for the unemployed, but found that statements
were quite mixed. Although Democrats were
more inclined to make statements in support of
the unemployed than Republicans, the latter
tended to mix positive with negative statements.)
Unemployment rates, the number of unem
ployed, industrial conflict, election years, party
in office, union membership, immigration, and
population size of the working class were coded
from official historical statistics. 8 We also coded
the length of a recession because it was believed
this may have an effect on our primary depen
dent variable, elite statements about unemploy
ment. The assumption is that two or more con
secutive years of high unemployment are more
likely to generate concern than only one year.
We defined a recession as eight percent unem
ployment or higher (which conforms to the his
torical descriptions of five major recessions in
the period under analysis). The first year of
eight percent unemployment was coded 1, the
second year coded 2, etc. To test for the impor
tance of party in office in explaining elite
statements we created dummy variables for
Democrat vs. Republican control of the House,
Sena te, and Presidency. To test for the impor
tance of "power struggles" during election peri
ods we created a scale suggesting the importance
of U.S. na tional elections. Non-election years
were coded 1, off year elections we coded 2, and
presidential elections were coded 3.
Least squares with the Cochrane-Orcutt
method of correcting for auto- correlation effect
was the primary statistical technique used
(Hibbs 1974; Johnston 1972; Kmenta 1971; Os
trom 1978). All variables were logged to reduce
skewness. It should also be noted that logic sug
gests some lagged relationships may exist be
tween some of our variables. However our use
of lagged variables to test for this possibility
indicated no significant lagged effects.
Findings. It will be useful to begin with some
historical description in reference to Figure I.
As can be seen, elites expressed very little pub
lic concern about working class issues such as
unemployment until the 1920s, and the timing ?f
the big increase seems rather unexpected \n
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many ways. There were very serious levels of
unemployment in time periods before the 1920s
and relatively low unemployment in the 1920s:
Th us, any explana tion of the poli ticiza tion of
unemployment cannot rely primarily on changes
in the level of unemployment. Before the 1920s
we fou,nd public discussion about recessions by
elites, 1ll the New York Times, but the discus
sion was directed toward lost profits and the
need to protect capitalists. For example in a
time of high unemployment we found' many
statements about the need for tariffs during the
Presidential election of 1896' there was almost
nothing said by the main Pres'identia1 contenders
McKinley and Bryan on the problems of unem
ployment. The working class did not seem to be
of interest to national political elites before the
1920s.
All of this changed drastically during the
1920s. When unemployment jumped to almost 12
percent in 1921 there followed extensive na
tional discussion of the problem. The Republi
cans even felt compelled to appoint a commis
sion to study the problem, headed by Herbert
Hoover (Garraty 1978). Then again the issue of
unemployment was raised extensively in the
presiden tial election of 1928, and the off-year
elections of 1930. But it is interesting to note
tha t the election of 1928 was during a time of
low unemployment. During the remainder of the
1930s, of course, unemployment continues to be
a major issue, especially during the election
years.
What we find, therefore, is a fundamentally
different political environment after 1920, and
especially so as we move into the 1930s. Our
nex t major question, therefore, is what changed
this political environment? Was it protest by the
unemployed which made political elites listen to
them and consider their problems? Figure 2 sug
ges ts tha t protest by the unemployed was not a
significant factor in the beginning of elite
statements about unemployment in the 1920s. We
found little protest by the unemployed before
1930. Figures 1 and 2 together show that neither
the rate of unemployment nor protest by the
poor stimulated the elite recognition of unem
ployment by the 1920s. But it is interesting to
note that by the first hint of the depression of
the 1930s (th.a t is, the year 1930), both elite
sta temen ts and protest shot upward in response
to onl y a bou t eight percent unemployment.
There was certainly a changed political envi
ronment, but it came before the long depression
of the 1930s.
We must turn to multivariate analysis to
check for the effects of other variables on the
increase in elite statements. When doing so our
above analysis of Figures 1 and 2 are supported.
Because of multicolinearity between unem
ployment and political variables we are required
to employ separate economic and political mod
els. The following six regression equations (three
fOr the economic model and three for the politi
cal model) include the variables found signifi

cant for any time period, and are broken down
for the 1891-1940 period, 1891-1919 and 1920
1940 periods:
Political Model
1891-1940
Elite Statements =

31.452 + 2.719 Protest -.013 Strikes
(10.169)
(.510)
(.005)

+

e

2

R=.66, R A =
= .41, P < .001, D.W. =
= 1.953
1891-1919
Elite Statements = 2.053 + .815 Protest
(.995)
(.519)

-.001 Strikes + e
(.001)

2

R=.46, R A = .15, P < .05, D.W. = 2.297
1920-1940
Elite Statements = 63.93 + 2.564 Protests
(22.79)
(.792)

+e

-.018 Strikes
(.011)

2

R=.62, R A = .31, P < .05, D.W. = 1.537
Economic Model
1891-1940
Elite Statements = -8.032 + 5.365 Unemployment Rate
(6.601) (1.148)

+e

2
R = .56, R A = .30, P< .001, D.W. = 2.546
1891-1919
Elite Statements = .971 + .406 Unemployment Rate
(.999) (.187)
(.187)�

+ e�e

2

R = .38, R A = .12, P < .05, D.W. = 1.559
1920-1940
Elite Statements = -3.279 + 6.051 Unemployment Rate
(16.689) (1.427)

+e

2

R =.70, R A = .46, P < .001, D.W. = 2.061

The above regression equations were esti
mated by least squares. Underneath each esti
mated coefficient is the standard error of that
coefficient, along with the R, adjusted R 2 , sig
nificance level, and Durbin-Watson statistics.
Both the political model and economic model
show protest and unemployment are related to
elite statements, but this is primarily after the
changed political environment in the 1920s. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the path
model in Figure 3 combining the effects of un
employment and protest on elite statements.
(Strikes were excluded from the path model be
cause of their weak relationships to elite state
ments.) The path model for the overall time pe
riod is strong (R 2 =.37 P < .001), but the path
m~el for the 189t-1919 period is much weaker
(R .A=.22, P < .05). For th'2 1920-1940 period the
path model is strongest (R A =.44, P < .01).
Conclusions. We must conclude that none of
the independent variables measured in this
analysis help us understand the politicization of
the issue of unemployment beginning in the
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1920s. The rate of unemployment and protest by
the unemployed are more strongly related to
eli te sta temen ts in the 1920-1940 time period.
Significant protest by the unemployed did not
begin until the 1930s, thus this cannot explain
the emergence of elite statements in the 1920s.
The rate of unemployment is clearly related to
elite statements in the 1920s and 1930s, but the
relationship was much weaker before the 1920s.
In our view, the Piven and Cloward (1982)
thesis about the politicization of working class
issues seems most plausible. The political envi
ronment changed in the 1920s because the
Democratic Party began losing voters. They
needed a new constituency to replace the older
progressive coalition, and because of election
laws and demography producing more potential
working class voters, the Democratic Party went
after the working class vote. To go after the
working class the Democratic Party had to tell
the working class what the political system
could do for them. Our data indicate that the
poli ticiza tion of working class issues began
somewhat sooner than most people recognize
(e.g., Garraty 1978; Piven and Cloward 1982),
but the timing of this pOliticization (the early
1920s) provides even stronger support for the
idea that politicization of working class issues
was the result of pOlitical elites seeking a new
constituency -- this was the time Democrats be
gan losing more and more elections.
None of this is to suggest that protest activity
and political violence are not primary ways that
the lower classes have influenced the political
system. The many studies providing empirical
support for the Piven and Cloward (1971) thesis
that welfare expansion in the United States has
been the result of turmoil by the poor show the
importance of political violence as a means of
lower class political influence (e.g., Shram and
Turbett 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981). But our
findings also suggest that the more recent view
of Piven and Cloward (1982) is also accurate:
there can be an expansion of democratic institu
tions in capitalist societies so that the lower
classes are able to gain some political influence
through traditional party politics. Which is also
to say that the dynamics of class conflict is
much more complex than earlier mass society
theorists such as C. Wright Mills (1956) recog
nized.
NOTES
Revision of a raper presented at the meeting of the Interna
tional Sociologiea Associations Research Committee on Social
Stratification, Duisburg, West Germany, May, 1985.
1. This coding procedure excluded primarily strikes or other
collective action by the employed. Some of these events were on
the behalf of the unemployed\ but it was difficult to separate out
the most important issue benind the strike. Specifically, under
protest by the unemployed we coded the number involved, loca
tion, target, and goals of action, number arrested, injured, and
killed.
2. We selected 1908! 1913, 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1929 for va
lidity checks. The overa I agreement rate was 87 percent.
3. This method was employed to make sure the New York
Times Index was accurate and employed accurately. Reading the
entire Index was impossible, but we found some key index head-.
ings most likely to contain the information required (especially

"unemployment"). The years and month~ selected fo~ this analysis
were selected because they were electIOn years wIth high un
employment, but with very few protest events located in our cod
ing procedure. The dates examined were January to March 1894
August to November 1.894, August to November 1896, and August
to November 1908. ThIS method strongly confirmed the validity of
our coding procedures.
4. The selection of time periods to reexamine in the San Fran
cisco Chronicle followed the selection described in note 3 above.
5. It is worth noting that none of the coders worked on both
protests and elite statements. Such a procedure could have incor
rectly inflated the relationship between the two variables.
6. Our working assumption was that if a statement about the
unemployed by an individual or group was emphasized in the New
York Times Index, the group or individual should be considered
elite. Such was not always the case, of course. Unfamiliar names
were looked up in biographical sources if sufficient information was
not in the newspaper article. The level of elite status was coded as
city level, state level, or national level for organizations, and for
the position held in the case of individuals. Elites and organiza
tions were also divided into institutional sectors (e.g., political
business, religious, charity, and other voluntary organizationsf
Labor leaders and labor organizations were excluded because it
was assumed they were more directly tied to the unemployed. We
were more concerned with the actions of the lower classes (i.e.,
protest).
7. The codin~ of elite statements proved to be a very difficult
process for the' big years" (i.e., those years with 100 to 200 or
more news articles containing elite statements). The New York
Times Index was not always clear on whether or not a statement
by an individual or organization was in the news article. Thus,
judgment errors were made by coders, but primarily only in big
years. A result is that we have an underestimate of elite state
ments for the big years, which produces a conservative estimate of
the number of elite statements. The years selected for recoding bl'
the authors were 1908, 1913, 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1934. Overall
coder agreement was 67 percent, and 72 percent for national po
litical elites only. Excluding 1934 (a big year), however, coding
agreement was 78 percent overall, and 92 percent for natioual level
political elites.
8. The source for unemployment rates, the number of unem
ployed, immigration, working class population election years, and
the party in office was, U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (1975). The industrial
conflict data was obtained from the HistOrical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, and John I. Griffin, Strikes:
A Study in Quantitative Economics (1939). We included the data
on the size of the working claBS and Immigration rate to check for
the possible influence of these factors on elite recognition of unem
ployment. Working class size showed no significant correlation to
elite statements, but the immigration rate showed a surprisingly
strong negative relation to elite statements. Using multivariate
analysis, however, suggests this negative relation between immi
gration and elite statements is due to the negative relation be
tween immigration and unemployment. When unemployment went
up there was usually reduction in immigration.
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